Greek philosophy; stoicism; influence; Islamic philosophy; history; MA thesis.

This volume, included in the recently established Library of Philosophy and Religion, devotes its primary attention to recent discussion within analytic philosophy concerning the challenge which determinism offers to the concept of freedom and, thereby, to Christian theism. Although the author does not argue that determinism has been established, he does conclude that it is an empirical proposal and may well represent the situation. He is prepared to fall back upon a libertarianism if necessary, but considers determinism at face value (...) in order to confront the most serious opposition to his proposed compatibilism. There may be a sufficient condition for all acts, which would be, thereby, a determinism. Young’s problem is to establish a compatibilism so that even if a sufficient condition for all acts does hold, man is still free and responsible, and a Christian theism could be preserved. He proceeds to analyze four types of sufficient condition: 1) some laws of logic are sufficient for all outcomes; 2) antecedent causal conditions account for all outcomes; 3) God’s infallible knowledge and His eternal nature are the sufficient conditions for whatever happens; 4) an omnipotent deity is the sufficient condition of all outcomes. Young then attempts to establish that a doctrine of freedom and responsibility is compatible with each of these conditions and, thereby, Christian theism is, to that extent, secured. He offers a very careful analysis of each alternative, considering the strongest claims of recent analysts, and still finds a doctrine of responsible freedom viable, analysed in terms of ability and power to act. In the course of his analysis he gives more attention than the skeptic usually offers to the content of the skeptic’s world, and what would be involved in its analysis of freedom, action, responsibility, and evil. The skeptic’s world offers more theoretical problems than the skeptic’s neglect of his own positive position and his confining of analysis to a critical role has usually acknowledged. Although one might not have expected it to arise in such quarters, it is now well established that analytic philosophy offers a well developed and complex elaboration of natural theology and philosophy of religion, and in the revival of natural theology in analytic circles this book deserves careful attention.—H.A.D. (shrink)

This anthology of previously published essays brings together some of the best scholars in the growing dialogue between two manifestations of man's existence, the literary and the religious. This is not simply a discussion of how theologians influenced literature, or how literature influenced theology, but treats the variety of approaches to the relationship as well as the impact of each manifestation upon the other. Attention is given to the humanizing function of both in a period when humanizing, even among the (...) educated, is long overdue. Special attention is given to the various and ambiguous ways in which literature and religion deal with man's ultimate perplexities. That they do is clear, but how they differ in doing so is far from clear. Hence one notes the religious character of the literary creative process, the development of literary models of theological criticism, the revelatory function of poetry, and the evaluative function of literature. Insight is offered the philosopher regarding literature as the extension of conviction, the logic of literary expression, and the development of a logic of the possible. The growing dialogue between religion and literature evidenced in this volume as already quite mature leads to regret that one might seek in vain for comparable maturity in the parallel dialogue between literature and philosophy.--H. A. D. (shrink)

Exceptional human experiences (EHEs) have garnered increasing research attention, particularly with regard to the characteristics and potential functional aspects of these experiences. The current study sought to replicate and expand upon previous research on EHEs by using a mixed-methods approach to examine the characteristics of EHEs in a large adult sample. The participants were 869 healthy adults who completed a survey that allowed participants to share both quantitative ratings and qualitative descriptions of EHEs. The results revealed that 96.7% of respondents (...) had experienced at least one EHE, and EHEs were generally rated as having a positive impact on the participants' lives. Participants reported a variety of EHEs, with two primary themes emerging in the qualitative analysis: perception and function of EHEs. The results suggest that EHEs may serve a positive, functional purpose in the lives of those who experience them. (shrink)

This introductory textbook is a combination of text and anthology, and also includes student exercises. It intends to be analytic in its approach, and the readings as well as the text are almost exclusively confined to recent analytic concerns. As its point of departure the author takes Broad's distinction between speculative and critical philosophy, with critical philosophy identified with analysis. As illustrative of the use of this distinction it is suggested that science has increasingly eliminated questions about "life and the (...) universe" from appropriate speculation. Consequently philosophy is to aid in the coordination of scientific conclusions into a "balanced world-perspective," but philosophy does not interpret the whole of reality. The charge that all people, after all, have a metaphysical position is recognized but avoided by the claim that no clear analysis of the whole of reality is available, and by the proposal that no criteria are available to distinguish a better speculative theory from a less valid one. Critical philosophy is to analyze the assumptions of science, religion and ethics, not in order to develop a speculative system but to clarify how these assumptions function. Critical philosophy studies ideas about the world, more properly, the logical relation of such ideas, and not the world itself. The objectivity of such ideas lies in the agreement about rules for the use of such ideas. Having clarified the function of philosophy, interpretations are offered of meaning, truth, logic and explanation. By now one should not be confused, for it is the first requirement of the philosopher to be clear as to what he is doing. However, one may fear that even analytically inclined beginning students might have preferred a more analytic and thereby more clarified approach to the fundamental distinction between speculation and analysis upon which basis the entire book is projected.--H. A. D. (shrink)

A leading psychologist at the Menninger Foundation analyzes the current cultural situation where deep unbelief alienates itself from classical belief. He recognizes that unbelief is not just a simple negation of belief but is itself pluralistic, and the varieties of unbelief have now become the attitudes of masses of modern men. The author makes extensive use of recent philosophical reflection. He is also well aware of how social policy may tend to replace what had once been religious goals and institutions, (...) and how secular institutions may become the vehicle of sacred values. Both belief and unbelief are understood as aspects of man’s pursuit of happiness, although the classical philosophical considerations of this happiness principle are never debated. The psychological foundations of the book lie in psychoanalytic object relations theory suggesting an isomorphism between personal relations and the relations between the self and reality. Overbeliefs, [[sic]] whether secular or religious, are analyzed as a function of such object relations. With this in mind the author treats, for both believers and unbelievers, problems of dependency and autonomy, mystery, options, Providence, and fantasy and reality. The analysis and suggestions will be helpful to the lay audience but will not seem especially new to trained philosophers. Strangely enough, the author himself seems to remain in the position between belief and unbelief. He understands each side sufficiently well so as not to reveal decision for either but offers instead a strong philosophically supported plea for tolerance. It is even stranger, in a book concentrating upon the alienation from belief, that so much analysis is given to the nature, content, and psychology of belief. Unfortunately, what one misses the most is what is most needed and desired in a more secular culture; a profound and penetrating analysis of the psychology or psychologies of the unbeliever. Just how the sincere secular man’s psychological character operates to affirm unbelief, involving the psychological analysis of his character so that we may understand his attitude toward anxiety, despair, suicide, hope, self-respect, concern and care, the psychology of tolerance, mortality and death, meaning and meaninglessness surely deserve the same depth and care of analysis that hundreds of years in the psychology of belief has offered, but this, one does not find. One can only hope that out of his extensive clinical experience the author will further reveal the deep ambiguities and psychological character of the sincere unbeliever and his internal struggle with the good, the true, and the beautiful. In such an analysis the profound struggle of unbelief with any classical theories of man’s natural inclination towards belief, clarifying precisely what is being denied, and how one negates it and lives with this negation psychologically, would form a fascinating adventure into the psychological processes of contemporary secular man.—H.A.D. (shrink)

The first of a promised trilogy, to be followed by studies of Logic and the Theologians, and Philosophy and the Theologians. Professor Holmer is a superb iconoclast, and the idols he loves to smash are metaphysics, theories, big ideas, ideologies, philosophies, and philosophical theologies. The book is very subtle in analyzing the logic of religious language, which language succeeds very well without philosophical interpretations attempting to state or restate its "meaning." The essay is a careful blending of Kierkegaardian motifs with (...) the linguistic methodologies of the later Wittgenstein. There are few books as successful in elaborating the nuances of the Biblical language unencumbered by theories attempting to reinterpret this language. The tendency to reinterpret and translate in order to provide "the meaning" is the constant, unsuccessful, and unnecessary, temptation of the age. Such attempts inevitably conclude by offering another language and another meaning, and seriously distorting, if not losing, the meaning of the original. No such philosophical translation is necessary if one will but heed the logic and grammar of the original language, which has its own inner structure, message, and meaning, deserving of careful attention, and quite sufficient to keep bright young minds busy. Holmer loves the profundity of simplicity, and would call all who are tempted by abstractions and metaphysics, which are surely the core of the devil’s grammar, to return to the simplicity of the original with its own unique depth and challenge. The "old old story" need not be made "new," nor does it require philosophical explanation. The performatory utterances of the Hebrew children and their Christian offspring are sufficient if one will but study their logic. In the Western world’s attempt to wed Jerusalem and Athens, Holmer will remain in Jerusalem, requiring little from Athens. While needing no philosophy or metaphysics, he nevertheless seems to offer a very intricate philosophy of language, meaning, fact, explanation, reason, concepts, and knowledge, traveling upon this Wittgensteinian way as if no serious challenge had been offered to this anti-philosophical philosophy, and to the anti-metaphysical polemic contained therein; and as if these proposals themselves did not border on the edge of their own metaphysical ideology and vision regarding words and thoughts. One hopes that the promised sequels will deal more directly with the suggestion that all metaphysics be eliminated, for it simply will not do to replace one ideology with another in the name of not having any at all. In spite of this nagging problem, the book is worthwhile.—H.A.D. (shrink)

In this careful and fresh analysis of the relationships between facts, words and beliefs, the author attempts to clarify how images and words relate to the world so as to establish beliefs and support knowledge. The reader is first presented with the ontological background of the analysis, including the status of sense-data, the nature of universals and our experience of them, and the epistemological status of the world. Sprigge then turns to a discussion of semiotic background including pragmatic and semantic (...) meaning, and the nature of reference. After supplying these foundations, the heart of the book concentrates upon the act of believing with attention focused upon the idea of the image, and the distinction drawn between imagism, imagist-activism, and imagist-mentalism, the latter of which he supports. He also defends phenomenalism against the criticisms of Austin, while developing as well a doctrine of intentionality rooted in Findlay’s interpretation of Meinong. He offers an extensive critique of behaviorism leading to his imagist-mentalism position, while his analysis of belief takes serious issue with Russell. (shrink)

Vol. 24 of Boston Studies In The Philosophy Of Science, this study includes a few essays previously published. It presents a philosophy of technology as a relatively new specialization and is offered in a Heideggerian and phenomenological mode. Contemporary philosophy has presented modern man with a great deal of philosophy of science but little specifically on technology, and Ihde finds Heidegger one of the most insightful sources for such reflection. The book includes specific sections devoted to Heidegger, Jonas, and Ricoeur. (...) Ihde’s interpretation of technology, with its Heideggerian roots, presents an anti-Platonic theory with an emphasis upon the primacy of praxis. Furthermore, he argues for the ontological primacy and priority of technology over science, for science is really the tool of technology. The alternative and more usual scheme presenting science as primary and technology as offering but applied science is fundamentally Platonic, assuming the primacy of theory over practice and mind over matter. Consequently, concern with the primacy of practice necessitates a philosophy of action which itself is primary to a theory of cognition. A science so grounded in and secondary to praxis and technology suggests thereby that science is by no means value free. Any such historical science is both an assertion of certain values and a denial of others. Neither is technology as the ground of science value free, for it is a decision as to how to live the world. Science itself is embodied in its instruments which themselves provide the conditions for its cognition. We may choose to live the world with machines, and consequently serious consideration of the relations of humans and machines is at stake in such inquiry. We can, for example, experience the world through the machine, or the machine itself may become the object in experience. We have only begun to explore the world of instruments and the implications of that world, for an instrumental world raises its own formulation of the problem of determinism, concerning whether the instruments themselves determine the course of the inquiry, although Ihde denies that this is the necessary conclusion. All of the above is to emphasize that the elaboration of technology transforms experience, for the technologies themselves offer an analogy to nature by offering self-extension, by becoming the other, and by providing their own immediate world. The instruments have both a magnifying and reductive office, thus evidencing their lack of neutrality. In these various modes they express a telos of human desire attempting to bring close what otherwise remains hidden. In this process of bringing close there is retained the ever present reflexive temptation to turn back upon the interpretation of the subject its world of instruments. Thus technology offers a manner of transformation both of the world and of the self. There is no presuppositionless vision, for vision has its setting within a set of beliefs as to what is taken as vision, an obvious transformation of the Husserlian phenomenological program of a presuppositionless looking. In technical science there is no "just looking" as the Greeks had thought, and this transformation inevitably has its significant effects upon the very essence of man. In fact, perhaps technology is a most serious expression of the ambiguity of man’s nature so that he has become a threat to himself. Ihde’s exploration of a philosophy of technology is at the same time an exploration of the lebenswelt of modern man. There remains to be explored study of the essence of man who remains potentially so self-destructive via technology, but this is hardly the theme of a philosophy of technology. It is, however, the theme to which the philosophy of technology points. The book is very useful and one might wish that it would receive not only the attention of philosophers but find its way into the serious considerations of the technologists and masters of technology themselves. If it is inevitable that such a hope remains pure utopianism, then we shall all reap the whirlwind.—H.A.D. (shrink)

The author, a member of the faculty in philosophy at Visva-Bharati University, produced this volume under appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, after having studied in England. These four essays are concerned with recent analytic thought, concentrating upon the problem of identity and the experiments of reflection which have appeared in modern British philosophy, such as Strawson’s world of nothing but sound. Chandra’s central concern is to analyse the relationship between identity and continuity, and to (...) show that these concepts are not identical. Thus the book is an extended essay in conceptual clarification and logical geography. Saying that a is identical with b is not to say that a is continuous with b. All of this is undertaken because the author finds this inappropriate identification pervasive in contemporary philosophy, and the source of considerable logical confusion, especially in the consideration of personal identity. As an underlying theme attention is also focused upon the relevance of this issue to the debate concerning philosophical skepticism. Strawson’s sound world is seen as an attempt to refute the skeptic, which attempt fails because of Strawson’s failure to distinguish between identity and continuity. With the failure of Strawson’s attack upon the skeptic, and perhaps the phenomenalist as well, his defense of material bodies is thereby undermined. In addition to Strawson, Chandra studies Price, Ryle, Hick, and the very recent work on personal identity by Parfit. The author concludes that identity is consistent with discontinuous existence. He also offers an analysis of after-images, including not only visual after-images but after-images of taste as well. A further underlying theme is the use of science in such thought experiments, for they are frequently presented as if they were of a scientific character, thus exaggerating scientific capabilities. However, the nature of the relationship between philosophy and science is hardly clarified, and the nature of scientific limits remains vague throughout the book. Chandra has isolated a unique feature of contemporary analytic philosophy for consideration, for few others have so concentrated upon this strange feature of thought experiment which pervades British philosophy, nor the identification of identity and continuity. The book would have been improved tremendously, however, if the author had only indicated much more clearly than he does the philosophical conclusions which he wishes to draw from his reflections. These constantly remain uncertain and ambiguous.—H.A.D. (shrink)

This is a very readable survey of recent analytic philosophy of religion, concerned primarily with problems of religious language and meaning. Consequently, philosophy of religion is seen as an aspect of epistemology. The book should serve very well as an introduction to philosophy of religion as engaged in by analytic thinkers, especially in regard to their analysis of Christian thought. A major virtue of the book is that it extends beyond the positivist’s concern with verification in order to survey much (...) of the discussion of religious language offered more recently. It is suggested that the positivistic crisis is now history, and consequently religious discourse deserves and is receiving the careful attention it requires without being subject to the many a priori biases which infected positivistic interpretation of such language. The author appears unsatisfied with religious language analyzed in a variety of performatory ways, and seeks some hint of objective knowledge. Language analyzed in the context of models appears suggestive. It relates religions language in an appropriate way to recent theories of scientific language, and allows for a fruitful correlation of fact and faith. The emphasis upon models for the interpretation of religious language paves the way for a reinterpretation of the doctrine of analogy while such analogy, at least for the believer, escapes the danger of an infinite analogical regress.—H. A. D. (shrink)

The paper discusses regularisation of dualities. A given duality between (concrete) categories, e.g. a variety of algebras and a category of representation spaces, is lifted to a duality between the respective categories of semilattice representations in the category of algebras and the category of spaces. In particular, this gives duality for the regularisation of an irregular variety that has a duality. If the type of the variety includes constants, then the regularisation depends critically on the location or absence of constants (...) within the defining identities. The role of schizophrenic objects is discussed, and a number of applications are given. Among these applications are different forms of regularisation of Priestley, Stone and Pontryagin dualities. (shrink)

Jaspers’s autobiography presents reflection upon the career and work of one of Germany’s leading existential philosophers. He describes briefly his early life and offers reflection upon his study and work in psychiatry. One can readily find the seeds of his later philosophical reflections evident in his General Psychopathology. Jaspers also presents illuminating discussion of his academic career, his political reflections, and comments upon the relationship of his philosophical analysis to his theological orientation. He offers extended discussion of each of his (...) major philosophical books, with insight into the origin and intentions of each volume. In addition, he presents valuable comments upon the philosophical climate of Germany against which he succeeded in reacting with vigor. Special attention is given to Rickert and E. Mayer. His rather detailed description of his relationship with Heidegger is especially illuminating. Although both of these thinkers played a leading role in the development and elaboration of German existentialism, there has been little direct and explicit consideration of the works of one by the other, or comments upon their "Being-With." Jaspers tells of his early and friendly relationship with Heidegger, their long working conversations, how their thought wandered down different pathways, and his reaction to Heidegger’s involvement in the rise of National Socialism. He also writes of his reaction to Heidegger’s Being and Time, of his unfulfilled intention to write seriously upon this work, and of how divorced his own thought was from Heidegger’s way, so that it did not even affect his own philosophical development. He describes the gradual cooling of the early friendship, and the eventual cessation of the long conversations and visits. All of the above offers a more intimate glimpse into the intersubjectivity of two of Europe’s leading thinkers, as seen by one of the participants, than has been readily available to the Western public to date. Perhaps someday there will be a publication of whatever Jaspers-Heidegger correspondence remains extant.—H.A.D. (shrink)

The first volume from the work of the Séminaire d’Etudes Phénoméologiques et Herméneutiques as a section of the Centre d’Histoire des Sciences et des Doctrines, this book is one of the latest statements in the continuing dialogue between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. In this instance there is the unique advantage of a very recent and careful statement of the results of the research of European thinkers offering a careful look at contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy. The first part of the volume is (...) an extended essay by Ricoeur concerning the language of action. Ricoeur, very familiar with Anglo-Saxon philosophy, is one of the most versatile thinkers to involve himself in the conversation between these two great philosophical traditions. He concentrates upon the contribution made by the insights of ordinary language philosophy to phenomenology, as well as the basic divergence between them. He deals especially with the difference between intersubjective interaction and the more scientific description of action as a part of the description of nature, while continuing his well known analysis of motives and causes. In this section he extends special attention to Anscombe, R. Taylor, C. Taylor, J. L. Austin, Strawson, Feinberg, Kenny, and von Wright. He also sets ordinary language philosophy in relationship to Husserl, thus giving special attention to the role of intentionality. (shrink)

This book is an interweaving of an introduction to philosophy of religion with extended argumentation regarding the relationship of religion and reason, including the implications of this argument for numerous problems of religious thought. The volume concentrates upon, and contains rather detailed discussion of philosophy of religion as it has been approached in recent analytic philosophy. After establishing the proper analysis of the role of philosophy in religious thought, it devotes special attention to the problems of evil, creation, miracles, prayer, (...) foreknowledge, ethics, and immortality. The book is written with a sympathy for a carefully delineated religious perspective, and, for the purposes of the volume, religion is considered explicitly from the Christian perspective. The author attempts to establish quite precisely the boundaries of philosophical reflection in the establishment of religious proposals. Philosophy is religiously neutral and can neither establish nor destroy religious conviction, although it can clarify the meaning of religious proposals. Religion is rational in the sense that it is not irrational. Philosophy can show that religious proposals do not need to conflict with scientific knowledge, nor end in self-contradiction, nor lack clarity. This is all of the defense of religion that one can expect from philosophy. Philosophy can also do the same for skepticism. (shrink)

This collection of previously published essays attempts to rescue the classical orthodoxy of Milton's theology from the oft-repeated charge of Arianism. With the discovery of Milton's theological essay Christian Discourses in 1823, scholars concluded that Milton's theological orthodoxy was questionable; he was suspected of the heresy of Arianism. Paradise Lost was then reinterpreted in the light of this widely accepted charge. This interpretation has lasted for over 100 years. Beginning in the 1950's, and quite independently, the authors of these essays (...) published papers attempting to show that the charge of Arianism was a misinterpretation: which conclusion, at the same time, required a reinterpretation of Paradise Lost. The issues to be resolved centered around the role of Christology in the trinity, and whether or not Milton subordinated the second person of the trinity in an unacceptable and heretical way. In order to restore Milton to the tradition of Orthodoxy, the authors were called upon to investigate the theological and philosophical vocabulary surrounding the language of essence, substance, person, and hypostaseis; [[sic]] and to analyze their philosophical relevance including the meaning of ousia as developed by Aristotle and the Stoics. It was also necessary to investigate the history of Christian thought, including both Reformation and Renaissance orthodoxy and the relationships of Milton to such traditions. They thereby traced Milton's orthodoxy back to Tertullian, to the orthodoxy of the creed of Nicea and its long dispute over Homoousia, as well as to a pre-Nicean orthodoxy. They found in pre-Nicean orthodoxy a doctrine of subordination which is not Arian and with which Milton is quite compatible. In view of Milton's role as the poet of the Logos, they investigated the Logos concept in Platonic and Neo-Platonic sources-noting the continuity, but also the differences, between Milton and such Neo-Platonism. They also distinguish Milton from the antitrinitarians among his contemporaries. One major section is devoted to the relationship of the Son to God; and another, to the relationship of the Son to man and the Universe: for not only did the authors need to establish the proper relationship within the Godhead, but they needed, as well, to escape the inclination toward pantheism. Finally the authors are able to reinterpret Paradise Lost in the light of Milton as a non-Arian, suggesting that his poetic solution of the problems of his age allowed him to reconcile orthodox dogma with poetic drama. Although the authors do not attempt here to reply to the responses which have already appeared to these articles since they were originally published, it is clear they have discovered a new Milton who deserves a voice. This collection will be a significant aid to students of literature and intellectual history in making a case for the Milton or orthodoxy available in a single volume.--H. A. D. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the symposium held at Wofford College in 1968, in celebration of the Bi-centennial of the birth of Hegel. Hegelian philosophy has strong roots in America, and for the past one hundred and fifty years it has offered a major philosophical perspective from which to interpret religious concepts and phenomena. Its immediate dialectical relationship to phenomenology and existentialism made it almost inevitable that the strength of this position would receive fresh attention as more recent moods (...) subsided. Consequently this book undoubtedly heralds a rebirth of Hegel scholarship and a renewed concern with Hegelian philosophy of religion after the serious criticism by Kierkegaardians and Marxists which has dominated recent philosophy of religion. The main papers include "Some Historical Presuppositions of Hegel's System" ; "The Young Hegel and the Postulates of Practical Reason" ; "Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind as a Development of Kant's Basic Ontology" ; "Hegel's 'Unhappy Consciousness' and Nietzsche's 'Slave Morality'" ; "Hegel's Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Spirit and the Religious Community" ; "Hegel and the Marxist-Leninist Critique of Religion" ; "'Authenticity' and 'Warranted Belief' in Hegel's Dialectic of Religion" ; "Hegel on The Identity of Content in Religion and Philosophy". The volume suggests the possibility of initiating dialogue with analytic philosophers regarding the Hegelian claim that "language is spirit," but such dialogue is never developed. In addition to bringing to light an interpretation of new source material for the study of the development of Hegel's position, there is also a unique interpretation of historical method. Henrich attempts to immerse his study more thoroughly in the immediate setting, biblical, theological, social and philosophical than did either R. Kroner or W. Dilthey in their classic studies of Hegel. At the same time the analysis of Hegel's relationship to Hölderlin is clarified with fresh interest for those who have been made conscious of Hölderlin through Heidegger. A number of the essays devote special attention to the Kant-Hegel relationship, analyzing with great care the Kantian atmosphere at the University of Tübingen and Hegel's place in this setting. If it is the case that secular theology is fundamentally a version of Hegelian immanence, then some of these essays can be seen as a restoration of the Hegelian doctrine of spirit in response to such secularization. On the other hand, if it is the case that the Kierkegaardian critique was a criticism of this very doctrine of immanence in the name of an "infinite gap" and that such Kierkegaardianism dominated philosophy of religion in the first half of this century, it is striking that so little direct confrontation of Hegel and Kierkegaard is attempted in these essays. It is time for Hegelianism to receive such renewed attention; but its dialogue with analysis, Kierkegaard, and phenomenology is still to be undertaken. We may be entering a period of genuine pluralism in contemporary philosophy where this very discussion can occur, and for this conversation these essays offer an excellent starting point.--H. A. D. (shrink)

This is an anthology in which all but one of the essays have been previously published. Western religious thought has made use of, or appropriated, or remained in dialogue with every major philosophical development from Platonism to Marxism. One of the latest versions of such appropriation, discovered as many would think in a most unlikely place, is the appropriation of analytic philosophy. A new natural theology is abroad in the land, and this volume attempts quite successfully to capture its current (...) state. If Flew and MacIntyre offered the first version of this dialogue and found analytic philosophy detrimental to western theism, this volume recognizes that more recent analytic philosophy has offered a second version and discovered analytic methodology as supportive of theistic philosophical persuasions. Essays by Ross, Rowe, Swinburne and Horsburgh consider the contribution of modal logic. Other essays by Alston, Bennett, and Hick, discuss the divine nature. Language and religion is developed by Ross, Pike, Plantinga, Rowe, Kenny, Mavrodes, Savage, and Donnelly. Miracle language is investigated by Holland and Dietl, while Gill discusses verification, and Chisholm the self. Although one may regret that some writers, Geach or Phillips, for example, are not included, it is time to recognize that natural theology has revived in our day by means of analytic philosophy, and this collection is an early and very successful reminder, as well as functioning as a good text for courses in the latest in philosophical theology on the Anglo-Saxon scene.—H. A. D. (shrink)

Centering upon a philosophical assessment of secular reasoning from Bacon to Kant, this volume becomes, thereby, a further contribution to the development of natural philosophy and natural theology. It involves, as well, an historical analysis of many of the philosophical-theological issues which received the attention of members of The Royal Society, among others, in their analysis of the relationship of theology and the rise of early modern science. Consequently, it is a contribution to the history of scientific thought, religious thought, (...) and a systematic defense of natural theology. (shrink)

Written by a former student and friend of Michael Polanyi, this book is an excellent introduction to Polanyi’s philosophical thought. Although it is written with a sympathetic appreciation of Polanyi’s philosophical contribution, it is neither simplistic, merely stringing together quotations from the subject of the study, nor uncritical. It is not intended as an in-depth study, but at the same time, it considers with seriousness Polanyi’s role on the recent philosophical scene, including his relationship to both analytic philosophy as well (...) as continental developments of gestalt psychology, phenomenology, and existentialism. Polanyi’s contribution to science is analyzed followed by a consideration of his change of emphasis from science to philosophy, philosophy of science, and social philosophy. (shrink)

Bastide offers a philosophy of value upon the foundations of French idealism, and a continuation of the strong French tradition of spiritualism and personalistic idealism. Koenig devotes special attention to the foundation of Bastide’s position in Descartes and Kant. In a typically French manner Bastide’s philosophical reflection is rooted in the Cartesian Cogito: it is Cartesian philosophy interpreted for systematic purposes, thereby developing the profound connection between Descartes and the French spiritualistic movement. In Descartes the immediate contact with being is (...) lost, realism is thereby undermined, and modern man and modern philosophy are forced to build upon subjectivity. Such self reflection is the direct road to spiritualism and idealism. In spite of many differences, this concern with the authentic spirit is developed further by a Kantian idealism. Koenig also devotes special attention to the more recent French scene, primarily Brunschvicg and Bergson, for Bastide draws heavily upon both, especially the former. Special attention is also given to the philosophy of spirit as developed by Le Senne and Lavelle, and to the philosophy of reflection as developed by Nabert. The reader is thus helpfully introduced to a significant strain of contemporary European thought parallel to, but critical of, the phenomenological and existential traditions which have come to represent European philosophy. Here is European French philosophy which is neither Marxist nor phenomenological. (shrink)

Outka offers an extremely interesting and useful study of the concept of agape concentrating upon recent theological literature, but discussing this in relationship to recent analytic moral philosophy. The work arises from the extensive use of the concept of agape in recent theology as in Nygren, but extends to other theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Tillich, and recent Catholic theology as in D'Arcy. He offers something of an anti-Niebuhrian polemic, and devotes a special chapter to Barth. The juxtaposition of recent (...) theology, especially Neo-Protestantism, with British analytic moral philosophy offers a fruitful and unique setting for the discussion. Analytic philosophy is not used to analyze the meaning of concepts by an analysis of the ordinary use of words, but is rather used to introduce the latest in moral analysis to the discussion of theologically substantive moral considerations. It is a strange setting, nevertheless, in view of the fact that most Neo-Protestant theological analysis, upon which he concentrates, developed in the context of continental, existential, and phenomenological analysis. While serious attention is devoted to Kierkegaard, Outka’s analysis of recent theological literature neglects the context of phenomenological development; and in its place juxtaposition is made with a movement which was not the milieu of the theologians under discussion. He sets recent existential theology and recent analytic ethics side by side. The book is thereby further evidence of the growing interest in the relationships between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, this time through a study of phenomenological theology. (shrink)

This collection of essays is presented in memory of Ronald Gregor Smith of The University of Glasgow, the well known translator of Martin Buber. Smith’s constant concern with the problems of secularization made the subject of the memorial volume most appropriate. The wide respect for Professor Smith’s thought, his visiting appointments in both Europe and the United States, and the fact that Scotland has long served as a theological bridge between European and Anglo-Saxon interests accounts for essays by S. M. (...) Ogden, W. McKane, H. Wardlaw, I. Nicol, D. Templeton, A. D. Galloway, H. Gollwitzer, and E. Bethge as well as the editor. A dynamic view of history as the avenue for speaking of God in a secular age is the common theme. Although the essays concentrate on theological concerns with secularization, Nicol and Templeton make extensive use of Collingwood’s philosophy of history as an approach to problems of history and transcendence. (shrink)

This paper examines an issue that is becoming increasingly relevant as the pressures of a warming planet, changing climate and changing ecosystems ramp up. The broad context for the paper is the intragenerational, intergenerational, and interspecies equity implications of changing the climate and the value orientations of adapting to such change. In addition, the need to stabilize the planetary climate by urgent mitigation of change factors is a foundational ethical assumption. In order to avoid further animal and plant extinctions, or (...) at the very least, their increased vulnerability to becoming rare and endangered; the systematic assisted colonization of “at risk” species is being seriously considered by scientists and managers of biodiversity. The more practical aspects of assisted colonization have been covered in the conservation biology literature; however, the ethical implications of such actions have not been extensively examined. Our discussion of the value issues, using a novel case study approach, will rectify the limited ethical analysis of the issue of assisted colonization of species in the face of climate change pressures. Beyond sustainability ethics, both animal and environmental ethical approaches will be used and intrinsic versus instrumental value orientations in the literature shall form the basis of our discussion. After the application of all the ethical approaches to the case studies, we conclude that without mitigation and the prospect of a future stable climate, assisted colonization will be involved in an inherently unethical process and a “move and lose it” outcome. With mitigation, there is wide-ranging ethical support for assisted colonization. (shrink)

This is a rich and rewarding book although its richness will be easily overlooked. It is in fact one of the first efforts to return American theology to one of its classical traditions, a theology of religious experience, not in the manner of scientism but religious experience in the manner of everyday human orientation. A review of this book may easily leave the impression of sentimental piety and lack of realism. Nothing could be further from the truth. The book is (...) anti-sentimental, post-secular theology, and post-existential. It is a new treatise on religious affection. What for many are abstract or empty theological categories are here given a direct and immediate meaning in everyday experience even in the midst of technological society. Modern man, identified as radial man in a radial world, lives in the presence of power with the problem of appropriating this power. To analyze this situation and in addition to more familiar thinkers, the author draws on often neglected sources which nevertheless have a living influence in his history—Edwards, Schleiermacher, Bunyan, Coleridge, and the New England Divine David Brainard. Conscious of the secularization of our day, but not in the tradition of "Death of God" theology, he isolates and analyzes the immediate and meaningful character of religious experience even in secular society. There also one seeks orientation to the powers which impinge upon one providing the central feature of religion. Faith is distinguished from both rationalism and voluntarism while returning to the Edwardian concept of "religious affection" as a total personal response to these powers. As power makes its impact upon us experientially in suffering, believing finds its place as a "form of valuing with self-restraint," and as "admiring with humility." Believing in God involves the self being diminished and enlarged, both fear and gladness, the experiential center of justification by grace through faith. The author offers thereby an elaboration of Kantian categories which provides conditions of experience. Those who expect an experiential approach to religion to be more scientific will be disappointed, and those who wish greater exactness will find the categories too metaphorical, but those who read with any religious sympathy and sensitivity will find not only a rewarding analysis of human experience but also a new direction in American theology. Even sensitive readers, however, will remain troubled by the possibility of interpreting the same experiences with nonreligious categories. That alternative is hardly discussed, the debate with purely secular categories is seldom joined, and the resolution of such an option seems to remain with the basic orientation of the reader, which is what religious faith or affection is all about. Those who have any interest in the possibility of a religious orientation to the powers in the midst of which we move daily should read this book.—H. A. D. (shrink)

To localize wheat ESTs on chromosomes, 882 homoeologous group 6-specific ESTs were identified by physically mapping 7965 singletons from 37 cDNA libraries on 146 chromosome, arm, and sub-arm aneuploid and deletion stocks. The 882 ESTs were physically mapped to 25 regions flanked by 23 deletion breakpoints. Of the 5154 restriction fragments detected by 882 ESTs, 2043 were localized to group 6 chromosomes and 806 were mapped on other chromosome groups. The number of loci mapped was greatest on chromosome 6B and (...) least on 6D. The 264 ESTs that detected orthologous loci on all three homoeologs using one restriction enzyme were used to construct a consensus physical map. The physical distribution of ESTs was uneven on chromosomes with a tendency toward higher densities in the distal halves of chromosome arms. About 43% of the wheat group 6 ESTs identified rice homologs upon comparisons of genome sequences. Fifty-eight percent of these ESTs were present on rice chromosome 2 and the remaining were on other rice chromosomes. Even within the group 6 bins, rice chromosomal blocks identified by 1-6 wheat ESTs were homologous to up to 11 rice chromosomes. These rice-block contigs were used to resolve the order of wheat ESTs within each bin. (shrink)